Mali

This document provides a summary of the anti-money laundering (AML) and countering the financing of terrorism (CFT) measures in place in the Republic of Mali as at the date of the on- site visit (4 to 15 March 2019). It analyses the level of compliance with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 40 Recommendations and the level of effectiveness of Mali's AML/CFT regime. It also provides recommendations on how the regime could be strengthened. 

Key Findings :

• Mali commenced its National ML/TF Risks Assessment in October 2018. The exercise was still in progress during the mutual evaluation on-site visit, nevertheless, an NRA draft report was available at that time. Competent authorities have a moderate understanding of the risks, particularly the TF risks faced by the country.

•  The TF risk in Mali is significant. This has been linked to the presence of terrorist groups in the country and sub-region as well as the occurrence of terrorist attacks in the country.

• The 2013-2015 AML/CFT strategy has not yet been updated and limited policy and institutional measures have been implemented.

• The Inter-Ministerial Committee (IMC) is the mechanism for AML/CFT national coordination at the policy level. The IMC has held some meetings to develop AML/CFT policies. However, the committee does not include certain key stakeholders. As regards coordination at the national level, there is room for improvement as law enforcement officers at the operational level appear to work in silos. The intelligence coordination framework on Terrorism appears to be effective in sharing information and intelligence on terrorism, however, the work of this committee may be limited by the non-inclusion of the FIU in the committee to which could ensure that the TF component is fully integrated into its operation.

•  Financial Institutions, including banks and large DFIs, have a good understanding of their AML/CFT obligations. They have put in place due diligence measures tailored to their risks and taken specific due diligence measures for high-risk situations, particularly with regard to PEPs. The banks provide training to their staff and file STRs with the FIU. The other sectors, including money transfer services and foreign exchange dealers, have limited knowledge of AML/CFT, resulting in weak implementation of preventive measures by the sector stakeholders, some of which face high ML/TF risks due to the lack of risk mitigation policies and a high number of cash transactions.

• The banking and financial regulatory authorities (BCEAO, Banking Commission and the Ministry of Finance), have some understanding of ML/TF risks, which is not the case with the other regulators (insurance and capital market). The supervisory authorities for insurance and capital market impose AML/CFT obligations on its reporting entities, but they have not yet put in place an appropriate methodology and supervisory tools to carry out any risk-based AML/CFT supervision. Off-site AML / CFT supervision within the banking sector and the DFIs are conducted regularly but on-site visits are increasingly rare.  Sanctions pertain only to prudential breaches and these are limited.  There is a lack of capacity of some supervisory authorities and self-regulatory bodies to conduct AML/CFT supervision. Mali is yet to designate an AML/CFT oversight authority for the DNFBP sector.

• Mali has a Financial Intelligence Unit that analyses the STRs it receives from reporting entities and information it collects from competent authorities. However, the information analyzed by the FIU is mainly from banks as other reporting entities do not comply with their reporting obligations and filed limited STRs. The financial intelligence disseminated by the FIU to the investigative and prosecutorial authorities is useful although this has not resulted in a significant number of prosecutions for money laundering or terrorist financing. There is however, the need to provide additional financial and technical resources at the FIU.

• The country has established specialized courts that conduct investigations and try ML cases. Mali has also established specialized institutions that handle a number of associated predicate offences. These specialized institutions, however, tend to consider only the predicate offence. The number of parallel ML investigations conducted by investigative and prosecutorial authorities during the investigation of a proceeds generating predicate offences is quite low. Moreover, a number of investigative prosecutorial and judicial authorities within the specialized court have not been sufficiently trained to enable them effectively conduct ML investigation and prosecution.

• The Malian authorities have a fairly satisfactory legal framework for the freezing, seizure and confiscation of criminal assets, including instrumentalities used or intended to be used in money laundering and predicate offences. Mali makes moderate use of provisional measures. Mali’s criminal control policy and AML/CFT strategy do not explicitly identify confiscations as a priority, and only a few criminal investigation officers and investigating magistrates have received training on financial investigation. As regards cash and bearer negotiable instruments in amounts exceeding the prescribed threshold, inquiries are not made to establish whether the amounts are linked to TF or ML. Furthermore, it appears that the implementation of confiscation of falsely declared or undeclared cross-border transaction of currency/BNI at the land borders is limited.

• Mali has not criminalized the financing of (i) an individual terrorist and a terrorist organization for any purpose or (ii) a foreign terrorist fighter. Mali faces significant TF risk emanating from home-grown locally funded terrorists on one hand and terrorists/ terrorist groups that have allegiance with and receive support from international actors on the other. The Malian authorities have established a specialized court and a specialized brigade to handle terrorism and TF cases. Nevertheless, investigative prosecutorial and judicial authorities have not been sufficiently trained to effectively conduct TF investigations, and do not systematically include TF in terrorism investigations. Mali has a counter-terrorism strategy. The strategy does not cover TF. At the operational level, the intelligence coordination committee on counterterrorism shares the national intelligence picture regularly with key agencies although, the TF aspect is not fully integrated into the work of the committee.

• Mali has a legal framework for the implementation of targeted financial sanctions on TF and proliferation. The mechanism for the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1267 has recorded some delays while the mechanism for the implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 is not yet operational. Mali has no mechanism in place for targeted financial sanctions relating to the financing of proliferation. The requirements for the implementation of proliferation related TFS are generally misunderstood and the reporting entities are largely not supervised to ensure compliance with TFS on TF and PF.  Mali has not conducted a comprehensive assessment of the NPO sector. There is no sustained awareness-raising campaign in the sector. There is no risk-based regulatory or supervisory mechanism in place, and the supervisory authorities of the NPO sector are under-resourced.

• Basic information on legal persons is contained in the Trade and Personal Property Credit Register (RCCM). This information is stored and archived manually. Due to the non-computerization of the registry and the RCCM, the information contained in the RCCM is not easily accessible to the public. Legal persons are subject to general obligations which could protect them from misuse for ML purposes. However, there are no sanctions to enforce compliance with these requirements and this raises issues with regard to the retention of adequate, accurate and up-to-date information. There is no obligation to keep beneficial ownership information in the RCCM and information on beneficial owners held by banks can only be accessed upon the consent of a state prosecutor. The authorities have not conducted an assessment of the legal persons operating in the country. Mali is gradually rolling-out of the OHADA software that will facilitate proper maintenance and timely access to basic information and identification of beneficial owners.

• The Republic of Mali has a satisfactory legal framework for mutual legal assistance and extradition and a central authority for international cooperation. Mali does not proactively seek judicial assistance. In addition, there is no comprehensive internal system of prioritization or case management to monitor the processing of requests for MLA, and extradition and there are delays in responding to MLAs. The FIU proactively requests for information from foreign counterparts. Other Malian Competent authorities regularly exchange information with foreign counterpart and use informal networks for this purpose.

•  Generally, Mali does not generally maintain comprehensive statistics on AML/CFT matters